Unverified50% confidenceDecision RuleExact time
AI is never the authorization layer; backend permission checks should be based on the real user's SAP roles.
1
Sources
50%
Confidence
Long-term
Relevance
10/20/2026
First Seen
Sources
SAP Meets MCP: 5 Architecture Patterns for AI Agents Connecting to S/4HANA
youtubeGP Satapathy10/20/2026
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